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Summary 
A human performance modelling approach is presented for risk assessment of operations with 
multiple, dynamically interacting agents. The approach is illustrated for a risk model of an 
incursion by a taxiing aircraft on an active departure runway. This model-based approach can 
provide detailed, systematically derived results regarding contributions to safety by human 
operators and technical systems in complex multi-agent environments. 
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1 Introduction 
Since capacity and efficiency are the drivers of the development of advanced air traffic 
operations, by now there is a broad consensus that appropriate accident risk assessment models 
are needed to assess safety in relation to capacity with the aim to optimise advanced air traffic 
operations (Wickens et al., 1998). Air traffic operations account for highly distributed and 
dynamic interactions between human operators, procedures and technical systems. As such, the 
safety of air traffic operations depends not only on the functioning of the individual elements in 
such multi-agent scenarios, but also on their complex interactions, especially in non-nominal 
situations. Because of this distributed control nature of air traffic, established techniques fall 
short in performing accident risk assessment. Blom et al. (2001) addressed this problem by 
development of a Monte Carlo simulation-based methodology that takes an integral approach 
towards human performance modelling and accident risk assessment for air traffic (Traffic 
Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer: TOPAZ).  
 
The human performance modelling approach followed in TOPAZ is based on a contextual 
perspective in which human actions are the product of human internal states, strategies and the 
environment (Amalberti and Wioland, 1997; Hollnagel, 1993; Wickens and Holland, 1999; 
Cacciabue, 1998). The model for task performance of a human operator considers multiple 
tasks, human error and contextual control modes (Blom et al., 2003). Specifically, for a human 
operator  
• the tasks of the human operator are identified,  
• the most relevant cognitive control modes are identified, 
• per identified cognitive control mode, the characteristics of the operator tasks are identified, 
• clusters of tasks are formed, 
• hierarchy and concurrency for the task clusters are identified. 
In such performance modelling, parameter values are based on operational observation, real-
time simulation and expert interviews. Corker et al. (2005) showed that an additional way of 
identifying parameter values is to make use of the more detailed human performance model of 
Air-MIDAS. 
 
In air traffic, situation awareness problems are important contributing factors to many accidents. 
The concept of situation awareness addresses perception of elements in the environment, their 
interpretation and the projection of the future status (Endsley, 1995). In an air traffic 
environment with multiple human operators, these aspects and associated errors of situation 
awareness depend on human-human and human-machine interactions. A model for situation 
awareness evolution in a multi-agent air traffic environment was developed (Stroeve et al., 
2003; Blom and Stroeve, 2004). Here, an agent is an entity, such as a human operator or a 
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technical system, which may have situation awareness of its environment. The environment of 
an agent includes the complete group of agents. The situation awareness of each agent consists 
of time-dependent information of other agents, including identity, continuous state variables, 
mode variables and intent variables. Achieving, acquiring and maintaining situation awareness 
depends on processes as observation, communication and reasoning. 
 
It is the goal of the current paper to elucidate the approach for multi-agent human performance 
modelling and illustrate it for simulation-based accident risk assessment of an active runway 
crossing operation. In the sequel of this paper, the risk assessment steps and the runway 
operation are described first, followed by methods and results of the simulation model with 
emphasis on human performance aspects.  
 
 
2 Accident risk assessment steps 
Following the TOPAZ methodology, assessment of the risk of an operation is performed in a 
number of steps: 
1. Determination of the scope: In collaboration with operational experts, determine the scope 
of the operation. Determine safety criteria and methods of the risk assessment. 
2. Description of the operation: Describe in sufficient detail the operation, including context, 
human roles and responsibilities, procedures and technical systems. 
3. Hazard identification: Identify non-nominal events or situations possibly having adverse 
effects on the operation. Particularly of interest are brainstorm results on situations and 
events for which pilots and controllers have complementary opinions.  
4. Construction of conflict scenarios: Hazards are related to conflict types and ordered with 
respect to root events, resolution events and effects. The resulting hazard structures are 
called conflict scenarios. Risk is divided into sub-risks related to the various conflict types. 
This enables efficient and orderly evaluation of risk.  
5. Argumentation-based evaluation: Evaluate the risk based on the conflict scenarios, 
interviews with operational experts (pilots, controllers) and incident databases. This 
provides a first indication of the severity and frequency of conflict scenarios. 
6. Development of a simulation model: Develop a mathematical accident risk model for 
conflict scenarios that are difficult to assess by argumentation-based evaluation. This 
stochastic dynamic model represents the performance and interaction of technical systems 
and human performance for a particular air traffic situation. 
7. Simulation-based evaluation: Evaluate potentially safety-critical and uncertain risks by 
Monte Carlo simulations based on the developed simulation model and hierarchical 
simulation speed-up techniques.  
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8. Evaluation of model assumptions: Assess the effect on the modelled risk of assumptions 
made in the modelling process. This step accounts for the recognition that a model differs 
by definition from reality. It includes an analysis of bias and uncertainty in assumptions as 
well as a risk sensitivity analysis, and results in an evaluation of bias and uncertainty 
bounds of the risk of the operation. 
9. Risk criteria: Compare the evaluated risk with risk criteria to assist decision-makers in their 
evaluation of the acceptability of the operation. 
 
Here, operational experts are actively involved during hazard identification, argumentation-
based evaluation and evaluation of model assumptions.   
 
 
3 Active runway crossing operation 
The active runway crossing operation enables traffic to cross an active departure runway 
(named Runway A) in order to taxi between the aprons and a second runway (named Runway 
B). Each crossing has remotely controlled stopbars on both sides of the runway. The operation 
includes a large number of interacting agents (see also Figure 1): 
• aircraft (taking off or taxiing), 
• aircraft’s flight management systems (FMS), 
• pilots flying (PF’s), 
• pilots not flying (PNF’s), 
• Runway A controller, 
• Runway B controller, 
• ground controller, 
• departure controller, 
• start-up controller, 
• ATC system, which is broadly defined to include 
- airport manoeuvre control systems, 
- surveillance systems, 
- airport configuration, 
- environmental conditions, 
- communication systems. 
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Figure 1:  Relations between agents identified for the active runway crossing operation.  
 
In the operation, communication between controllers and aircraft crews is via standard R/T. 
Monitoring by the controllers is via direct visual observation and is supported by radar track 
plots. The runway crossing operation over Runway A is under the responsibility of the Runway 
A controller. The Runway A controller is supported by a runway incursion alert system and a 
stopbar violation alert system. The Runway A controller manages the remotely controlled 
stopbars and the runway lighting. Monitoring by the aircraft crews is by visual observation and 
may be supported by the VHF R/T party-line effect. 
 
 
4 Simulation model 
An initial argumentation-based evaluation of the risk of the active runway crossing operation 
showed that of all identified conflict scenarios, there are three conflict scenarios that may pose 
unacceptable safety effects. In this paper, we focus on the details of an accident risk model for 
one of these conflict scenarios. In this conflict scenario there is one aircraft that takes off and 
has been allowed to do so and there is one aircraft that crosses the runway while it should not. 
Taxiing along a straight line over a standard runway crossing is considered. Hence, in the 
illustrative example of this paper, emphasis is placed on the models of the aircraft, pilot flying, 
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Runway A controller and ATC system agents. A high-level overview of these models is 
specified next. 
 
Aircraft 
A taking-off aircraft initiates take-off from a position at the beginning of the runway. A crossing 
aircraft initiates crossing at a position close to the remotely controlled stopbar with a normal 
taxiing speed or from a hold state. 
 
Pilot flying of taking-off aircraft  
Initially, the pilot flying (PF) of a taking off aircraft has the SA that take-off is allowed and 
initiates a take-off. During the take-off the PF monitors the traffic situation on the runway 
visually and via the VHF communication channel. The PF starts a collision avoidance braking 
action if a crossing aircraft is observed within a critical distance from the runway centre-line or 
in reaction to an ATCo clearance, and it is decided that braking will stop the aircraft in front of 
the crossing aircraft. 
 
Pilot flying of crossing aircraft  
Initially, the PF has the intent SA that the next airport way-point is either a regular taxiway or a 
runway crossing. In the former case the PF proceeds taxiing and in the latter case the PF may 
have the SA that crossing is allowed. The characteristics of the visual monitoring process of the 
PF depend on the intent SA. In case of awareness of a conflict, either due to own visual 
observation or due to an ATCo call, the PF stops the aircraft, unless it is already within a critical 
distance from the runway centre-line.  
 
Runway controller 
The Runway A controller visually monitors the traffic and has support from a stopbar violation 
alert and a runway incursion alert. If the ATCo is aware that a crossing aircraft has passed the 
stopbar, a hold clearance is specified to both the crossing and the taking off aircraft. 
 
ATC system 
The ATC system includes communication systems, tracking systems, a stopbar violation alert, a 
runway incursion alert and remotely controlled stopbars. 
 
Hazard Representation 
The model of the active runway crossing procedure accounts for intent-dependent and cognitive 
mode-dependent error-prone perception processes of pilots flying and the Runway A controller. 
Table 1 shows how a number of situation awareness related hazards of the operation considered 
were accounted for in the accident risk model.  
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Table 1:  Examples of the representation of hazards in the accident risk model of the active 
runway crossing procedure. 
Hazard Model representation 
Runway incursion alert is active, but runway 
controller has wrong ‘picture’ of the situation, 
and therefore reacts too late, not or wrongly. 
In response to an alert there is a chance that 
the runway controller does not observe the 
conflict and therefore does not react. 
Pilots get confused because of complexity of 
the taxiways in the new operation. 
The PF of a taxiing aircraft may be aware that 
the aircraft is taxiing on a regular taxiway 
while it actually is on a runway crossing. 
Pilot reacts not, wrongly, too late or cannot 
react to conflict solving clearance of runway 
controller. 
There is a chance that the PF does not or only 
after a long time becomes aware of a 
clearance. 
 
 
5 Performance model of pilot flying 
The various human performance submodels are integrated into a simulation model. As an 
illustrative example, a model is presented of the pilot flying of an aircraft that taxies towards the 
runway crossing. A high-level overview of the model elements of the pilot flying agent is 
shown in Figure 2. The human operator model includes the following groups of model 
elements. 
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Figure 2:  High-level overview of the model elements of the pilot flying agent. 
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Task triggering 
Task triggering processes specify times at which it is desired to complete a task. They may 
depend on other processes, such as task performance and situation awareness. For example, the 
model blocks Monitoring Generator and Coordination Generator in Figure 2 represent task 
triggering processes of a pilot flying and specify times at which monitoring of the traffic 
situation and coordination with the pilot not flying is desired, respectively. These model blocks 
receive several inputs. For instance, the dependence of Monitoring Generator from Intent SA 
enables an intent-dependent visual updating frequency. 
 
Task scheduling 
Task scheduling processes determine which tasks should currently be processed by the human 
operator. Task scheduling processes may depend on other processes, e.g., task triggering, task 
performance and situation awareness processes. For example, in Figure 2 the Task Scheduling 
block represents a scheduling process with a fixed hierarchy and concurrency structure.  
 
Task performance 
Task performance processes describe the development of the progress of a task. They may, e.g., 
depend on task scheduling and cognitive mode processes. For example, in Figure 2 Task 
Performance depends on Cognitive Mode, resulting in a faster task performance in the 
opportunistic control mode with respect to the tactical control mode of the pilot flying.  
 
Cognitive control mode 
Cognitive control mode processes describe the cognitive control mode of the human operator. 
They may, e.g., depend on the number and types of scheduled tasks. See, for instance, the 
Cognitive Mode block in Figure 2.   
 
Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness model elements represent the state SA and intent SA, as outlined before. In 
Figure 2, the model blocks State SA, Intent SA and Conflict Detection represent SA components, 
where the latter block represents the detection process and the SA of a conflict. In Figure 2, 
State SA depends Cognitive Mode, representing that (errors in) the state SA updating process 
can depend on the cognitive mode.  
 
Task Specific Actions 
Task specific actions represent particular elements of tasks of a human operator. For instance, 
for a pilot flying these may include (see Figure 2) Crossing Actions, Takeoff Actions, Runway 
Taxiing Actions, Taxiway Taxiing Actions and Conflict Actions. 
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6 Conditional Monte Carlo simulations 
An accident risk assessment includes a risk decomposition, which supports efficient evaluation 
of the collision risk and promotes insight in the risk contributions. The evaluation of the 
collision risk is based on the probabilities and the conditional collision risks of combinations of 
event sequences, as have been identified in the decomposition process. The decomposition 
process considers whether alert systems, remotely controlled stopbar and communication 
systems are functioning well or not. The decomposition process considered in the example 
includes  
• the aircraft type of each aircraft to be either a medium-weight A320 or a heavy-weight 
B747; 
• the intent SA of the PF of a crossing aircraft concerning the next way-point (Taxiway / 
Crossing) and concerning allowance of runway crossing (Allowed / Not Allowed); 
• whether alert systems are functioning well or not; 
• whether the remotely controlled stopbar is functioning well or not;  
• whether communication systems are functioning well or not. 
 
Based on the simulation model and the accident risk decomposition, Monte Carlo simulation 
software is developed to evaluate the conditional collision risk for the events resulting form the 
decomposition process.  
 
 
7 Accident risk results of the model 
This section presents results of the simulation-based risk evaluation for a generic runway in 
good visibility conditions. Figure 3 shows the accident risk as function of the distance of the 
runway crossing with respect to the runway threshold. The probability of a collision decreases 
for larger crossing distances. Figure 3 also shows the decomposition of the total risk for the 
cases that the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft either intends to proceed on a normal taxiway 
(without being aware to be heading to a runway crossing) or intends to cross the runway 
(without being aware that crossing is currently not allowed). The largest contribution to the risk 
is from the situation that the pilot intends to proceed on a normal taxiway. The relative size of 
this contribution depends on the crossing distance and varies from 64% for crossing at 500 m to 
about 83% for crossing at 1000 m or 2000 m. 
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Figure 3:  Contributions to the total collision risk by the simulation model for the cases that the 
SA of the PF of the taxiing aircraft is to proceed on a taxiway, or to cross the runway.  
 
Table 2:  SA Dependent collision risk by the simulation model for crossing at a distance of 
1000 m (event condition is not distant dependent). 
SA by PF of 
 taxiing aircraft 
Probability per take-off 
 
Proceed taxiway Cross runway 
Probability of event  3.5 10-5 2.0 10-4 
Conditional collision risk  1.7 10-4 5.5 10-6 
Collision risk 6.0 10-9 1.1 10-9 
 
The collision risk in Table 2 depends on the probability of the particular SA condition and the 
probability of a collision given this condition, for a crossing distance of 1000 metres. The 
probability of the situation that a pilot taxies across the stopbar not knowing he is approaching 
the runway, is assumed to be a factor 5.7 smaller than the probability of the situation that the 
pilot starts crossing the runway while not allowed to do so.  Nevertheless, the largely enhanced 
conditional collision risk leads to a larger collision risk in the former case. The reduced 
conditional collision risk in the latter situation is due to better monitoring process of the pilot 
flying of the taxiing aircraft, if its crew is aware to be heading towards a crossing of an active 
runway. 
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Based on results of the accident risk model, it is possible to attain insight in the accident risk 
reducing performance of involved human operators and technical systems. Table 3 shows 
conditional collision risks for the situation that an aircraft taxies towards a runway crossing at a 
distance of 1000 m from the runway threshold while the pilot is aware to taxi on a normal 
taxiway. The conditional collision risks in Table 3 refer to cases in which the involved human 
operators either do (‘yes’) or do not (‘no’) actively monitor for traffic conflicts. A risk reduction 
percentage is determined by comparing the conditional collision risk with the situation in which 
none of the human operators is actively monitoring. In this case, a collision is only avoided by 
the lucky circumstances that the taxiing aircraft just passes in front of or behind the taking-off 
aircraft (case 0 in Table 3).   
 
Table 3:  Risk reduction achieved in the simulation model by various combinations of 
involved human operators for the situation that the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft 
intends to proceed on a normal taxiway. See main text for further explanation. 
Case  PF taxiing 
aircraft 
 PF taking-
off aircraft 
Runway 
controller 
Conditional 
collision risk 
Risk reduction 
0 no no no 8.9 10-2 - 
ATC alert systems on 
1 yes yes yes 1.7 10-4 99.8% 
2 yes no yes 4.0 10-4 99.6% 
3 no  yes yes 9.4 10-3 89.4% 
4 yes yes no 2.3 10-4 99.7% 
ATC alert systems down 
5 yes yes yes 2.2 10-4 99.8% 
6 yes no yes 1.7 10-3 98.1% 
7 no  yes yes 1.1 10-2 87.9% 
8 yes yes no 2.3 10-4 99.7% 
 
A number of model-based insights can be attained by comparing the results of Table 3.  
• It follows from case 1 that 99.8% of the accidents can be prevented by the combined effort 
of all human operators and alert systems. 
• It follows from a comparison of cases 1 and 5 that in the normal situation that all human 
operators are actively monitoring, ATC alert systems (runway incursion or stopbar violation) 
almost have no effect on the achieved risk. 
• It follows from a comparison of cases 1 and 4, and cases 5 and 8, that the risk reduction that 
can be achieved by the tower controller in addition to the risk reduction of both pilots is very 
small. 
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• It follows from comparison of cases 1 and 3, and cases 5 and 7 that the pilot of the taxiing 
aircraft has the largest capability to prevent a collision in this context. 
 
 
8 Discussion  
The accident risk assessment methodology and the associated human performance modelling 
approach that are discussed in this paper, provide a systematic approach to risk assessment of 
operations with multiple, dynamically interacting agents. The combined effect of dynamically 
interacting agents is hard to assess by static or single-agent approaches. As an example, during 
an argumentation-based risk assessment of the discussed active runway crossing operation, 
pilots and controllers were asked to estimate their potential to prevent a collision as result of a 
runway incursion. Especially the contribution of the tower controller was overestimated, 
because this expert-based evaluation had difficulty to account well for the timing of actions of 
the pilots and controller. Through Monte Carlo simulations it has become clear that in good 
visibility conditions, a large part of conflicts is recognised and handled by the pilots before the 
controller can react.  
 
By definition a model is unequal to reality. Hence, application in a risk assessment of the 
discussed models requires an evaluation of the effect on the risk of the assumptions adopted in 
the modelling process (Everdij and Blom, 2002). This evaluation takes into account the 
particular context of the operation assessed and will be conducted in a follow-up study. Then 
interviews with pilots and controllers will be conducted to obtain their feedback on the 
assumptions made. In these interviews, typically asked questions will refer to single-agent tasks 
and aspects such as task duration. These kind of questions can be more easily estimated than 
small probability values (e.g., conflict resolution probability estimates in a multi-agent 
environment) such as typically included in interviews for argumentation-based risk assessment. 
 
The feasibility of using human performance modelling in accident risk assessment for a conflict 
scenario with a considerable number of interacting humans and technical systems has been 
illustrated for an active runway crossing operation. The model results stress the importance of 
proper situation awareness of the pilots flying for minimising runway incursion risk.   
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